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INTRODUCTION

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to
prohibit the deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest
without "appropriate procedural safeguards."' The California Court of
Appeal for the Fourth District recently decided what procedural
safeguards were appropriate for a post-termination hearing following the
discharge of a public employee. In Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan
Transit Development Board,2 the court held that all public employees
removable only for cause are entitled to a full, trial-like post-termination
evidentiary hearing where the government employer must prove its case
against the discharged employee.3 This Casenote questions the Townsel
court's holding.
Prior to the Townsel decision, no court had concluded that public
employees not subject to civil service statutes, or other statutory

schemes granting such a hearing, were entitled to full, post-termination
evidentiary hearings. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has never
held that a permanent employee is entitled to a full, post-termination
evidentiary hearing.! Townsel can be distinguished from the cases on
which the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District bases its
decision. In addition, an application of the proper constitutional
1. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,541 (1985).
2. 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231 (Ct. App. 1998).
3. See id. at 234.
4. See Holmes v. District Attorney, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 179 (Ct. App. 1998)
(recognizing that "[t]he [Supreme Court] has never held that an employee, tenured or
otherwise, must be given a full evidentiary hearing before or after being terminated").
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standards for determining the minimum requirements for posttermination procedural due process does not support the Townsel court's
broad holding. Consequently, this Casenote argues that while the right
result was reached in Townsel, the court's decision goes too far and
overstates the minimum requirements of post-termination procedural due
process.
I1. BACKGROUND

A.
1.

The Townsel Decision
FactualBackground

Rodric Townsel ("Townsel") was a code compliance inspector for the
San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Board ("MTDB").6

Though not a member of the civil service,7 Townsel's employment could

only be terminated for cause In April 1994, Townsel was discharged
for violating specific MTDB rules during an alleged assault of two
passengers at a trolley station on March 5, 1994.' Prior to his
5. Townsel inspected the fares of passengers boarding the San Diego Trolley
transit system to be sure that trolley passengers paid the proper fares. See Respondent's
Brief at 2, Townsel (No. D 026485).
6. See Townsel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 231.
7. Civil service is a government employee system where appointments and
seniority are based on merit or examination, as opposed to political patronage. See
WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 413 (3d ed. 1986).
8. See Townsel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 232. Those California public employees
falling within the coverage of one of several civil service statutes may only be terminated
for cause. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44932 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999) (setting forth
ten "causes" as the only grounds permissible for dismissing permanent employees).
9. See Townsel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233. According to a complaint filed with the
MTDB, Townsel put his arms around two female passengers while checking their trolley
fares. When they tried to get away, he grabbed one by the hair, and prevented the other
from calling the police by grabbing her by the face and neck and pushing her away from
a public telephone. See id. Townsel was criminally charged with misdemeanor battery
but was acquitted following a jury trial. See id.
Apparently, this was not the only incident Townsel was involved in during his
employment. The MTDB claims that Townsel had a "severe deficiency interacting with
the public, fellow employees and supervisory staff." Respondent's Brief at 2, Townsel
(No. D 026485). Townsel's disciplinary history indicated that he, among other things:
forced a woman passenger off a train using a judo move because she had the wrong fare;
used excessive profanity toward passengers while making radio transmissions; knocked a
passenger to the ground and handcuffed him after pulling him from the trolley, but let
him go after learning he was a peace officer; made a young man take his shoes and socks
off to search for money because he had an incorrect fare; and continually used
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termination, Townsel was provided with written notice of the specific
rules he violated, and was given a pre-termination "Skelly hearing."'" In
Skelly v. State PersonnelBoard," the California Supreme Court held that
because permanent civil service employees have a property interest in
continued employment, procedural due process entitles them to certain
pre-termination safeguards including "notice of the proposed action, the
reasons therefor, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the
action is based, and right to respond, either orally or in writing, to the
authority initially imposing discipline."' 2 Following the Skelly hearing,
Townsel was informed of his termination by the MTDB's general

manager. 3

Townsel appealed the general manager's decision to the MTDB's
Board of Directors and appeared twice in front of the three-member

committee appointed to hear his appeal.' 4 At the first hearing, Townsel
denied the allegations against him and argued that he was entitled to a
full evidentiary hearing.'5 At the second hearing, Townsel's demand for

a full evidentiary hearing was denied. 6 After hearing from the MTDB's
lawyers and questioning Townsel and a management witness, the
committee recommended upholding the decision to terminate Townsel's
employment. 7 The recommendation was ratified by the MTDB's Board
inappropriate and insubordinate conduct toward both passengers and supervisors. See id.
at 3-5.
10. See Townsel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233. A pre-termination hearing is called a
Skelly hearing in California after Skelly v. State Personnel Board, 539 P.2d 774 (Cal.

1975).
11. 539 P.2d 774 (Cal. 1975).
12. Id. at 788-89. The Skelly decision is essentially California's analogue to
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). In
Arnett, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court held that although the statutory
provisions of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act allowed civil service employees removable only
for cause to be discharged without a trial-type hearing, the Act did not violate procedural
due process because in creating the governmental right, Congress could also define the
procedures for removing that right. See id. at 151-54 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
The plurality opinion in Arnett was subsequently rejected by Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). Justice Powell agreed with the result in
Arnett, but he argued that because civil service employees could only be removed for
cause, the statute created a property interest in continued employment protected by
procedural due process. See Arnett, 416 U.S. at 166 (Powell, J., concurring). However,
he concluded that procedural due process was not violated in that case because of the
statutory safeguards provided in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act. See id. at 170. Those
safeguards included written notice of the reasons for the proposed discharge, access to
the materials on which the notice was based, and a right to respond either orally or in
writing. See id.

13.

See Townsel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233.

14.
15.
16.
17.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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of Directors.18 Townsel appealed the decision, but the superior court
concluded that Townsel had been afforded his constitutional rights by
virtue of his Skelly hearing.'9
2.

The Holding

The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District agreed with
Townsel. Reversing the superior court's decision, it held that he had a
right to a full post-termination evidentiary hearing in which the MTDB
had the burden of proving its case against Townsel.2 Specifically, the
court held that
the due process requirement of an evidentiary hearing at some point in the
termination process applies to any public employee who has a constitutionally
protected property interest in his continued employment, regardlessof whether
a statutory scheme
the employee is in the civil service system or is subject to
that specificallyprovides the requiredevidentiary hearing.21

Since such a hearing was not provided before termination, the court
reasoned that Townsel was entitled to a post-termination evidentiary
hearing. 2 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the following

rule:
"[P]rocedural due process requires that where a tenured government employee
is to be discharged: (1) he be given notice of the charges against him or other
cause for his discharge and an opportunity to respond to the official who is to
make the decision to terminate, and (2) he be given a post-termination
evidentiary hearing within a reasonable time after his discharge with a right to
reinstatement with back pay if his discharge is found to have been without good

cause."23

Finally, the court held that procedural due process required that such a
hearing be provided, despite the fact that the MTDB's regulations did
not provide for a full evidentiary hearing and the MTDB lacked the
power to issue subpoenas, administer oaths, or compel witness
testimony.24
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 236.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. See id. at 234.
23. Id. at 234 (quoting Kristal v. California State Personnel Bd., 123 Cal. Rptr.
512, 518 (Ct. App. 1975), disapproved on other grounds by Barber v. State Personnel
Bd., 556 P.2d 306 (Cal. 1976)).
24. See id. at 236-37. The court did address one additional issue, but it is beyond
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B. Scope of the ProceduralDue ProcessIssue
The Townsel decision is obviously a case involving the requirements
of Constitutional procedural due process. It is important, however, to
clarify precisely the narrow aspect of procedural due process that this

Casenote addresses.
The central meaning of procedural due process is that a party whose
rights are to be affected is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be
heard. 2' In addition, the notice and opportunity to be heard "must be
granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 6 From this
formulation, three distinct factors of procedural due process can be
identified: whether a hearing is due, when a hearing is due, and what
type of hearing is due.
1.

Is a HearingRequiredby Due Process?

The Townsel case did not address the question of whether Townsel
was entitled to a hearing. This element of procedural due process was
clearly met because Townsel had a constitutionally protected property

interest in continued employment.
The requirements of procedural due process must be met when a party
is deprived of liberty or property interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.27 Mere loss of public employment does not mean loss of a

liberty interest.'

Since property interests are not created by the

the scope of this Casenote. In addition to its claim that Townsel was not entitled to a full
evidentiary hearing, the MTDB argued that Townsel was collaterally estopped from
litigating the issue. See id. at 237. Prior to the incident giving rise to his termination,
Townsel had been suspended for three weeks and put on probation for six months for
violating several MTDB rules. See id. at 232. As with his termination, Townsel had
been provided a pre-disciplinary Skelly hearing. See id. Townsel filed a petition for a
writ of mandamus in the U.S. District Court claiming that he was entitled to a postdisciplinary evidentiary hearing. See id. The court denied the petition, holding that
"T[ownsel] is not entitled to the procedural requirements established for civil service
employees, because T[ownsel] is not a civil service employee. By receiving [a] Skelly
hearing, T[ownsel] received all he was entitled to under the law." Id. (third alteration in
original). As a result of this ruling, MTDB claimed that Townsel was collaterally
estopped from litigating whether he was entitled to a full post-termination evidentiary
hearing. The Townsel court rejected this assertion. See id. at 327-38.
25. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863)).
26. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
27. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,569 (1972).
28. See id. at 572-73. Liberty interests can be implicated in some cases of
deprivation of public employment. According to Roth, a decision to terminate, or a
refusal to re-hire a public employee, implicates a person's liberty interests when "[that]
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him." Id. at 573 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S.
433, 437 (1971)).
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Constitution but are defined by state statute, a procedural due process
right to a hearing only attaches if the state converts an otherwise optional
benefit into a property interest. 29
It has been widely held by both California and federal courts that if a
public employee is subject to discharge only for cause, that employee
has a property interest which is subject to the procedural due process

protections of the Constitution.3" Since Townsel could only be removed

for cause, there is no question that procedural due process entitled him to
a hearing. As a result, whether a hearing is required by due process is
not the critical component of procedural due process addressed by this
Casenote or the Townsel decision.

2. When Does Due ProcessRequire that a HearingBe Held?
Though related to the type of hearing required by due process, this
Casenote does not address the timing component of procedural due
process. The Townsel court held that permanent employees are entitled
to a full evidentiary hearing "at some point in the terminationprocess,"

and because Townsel did not receive such a hearing prior to his
termination, procedural due process required that he be afforded a posttermination evidentiary hearing.
This Casenote does not challenge the Townsel court's conclusion with
respect to when the full evidentiary hearing was to be held. Instead, this

Casenote focuses on the narrow issue of the type of hearing to which
29. See id. at 576-78.
30. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997) (recognizing that
public employees who can be discharged only for cause have constitutionally protected
property interest in their tenure and cannot be fired without due process); Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985) (holding that state civil service
employee removable only for cause had a property interest in continued employment and
thus fell within protections of due process); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring) (applying procedural due process rights to federal employee who
had a property right in continued employment because he could only be removed for
cause); Coleman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 805 P.2d 300, 304-05 (Cal. 1991)
(holding that statutory scheme regulating civil service employment confers due process
property interest on employees who achieve status of permanent employees); Skely v.
State Personnel Bd., 539 P.2d 774, 783 (Cal. 1975) (explaining that because permanent
civil service employees have a property interest in continued employment they are

entitled to procedural due process protections); Mendoza v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
144 Cal. Rptr. 117, 119 (CL App. 1978) (recognizing that employees dischargeable only
for cause have a protected due process property interest in continued employment).
31.

Townsel v. San Diego Metro. Transit Dev. Bd., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231,234 (Ct.

App. 1998) (emphasis added).
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Townsel was entitled. In so doing, it challenges the court's conclusion
that due process entitles all permanent employees to full evidentiary
hearings, regardless of whether they are members of the civil service
system or are subject
to a statute that specifically grants them a right to
2
such a hearing.1
3.

What Type of HearingIs Required by Due Process?

The procedural due process component upon which the Townsel
decision is based is the type of hearing required. More specifically, the
court decided what procedural safeguards are appropriate for a posttermination hearing following the discharge of a public employee.
Once it has been determined that a terminated public employee has a

property interest in continued employment, due process prohibits the
deprivation of the property interest without "appropriate procedural
safeguards."" The United States Supreme Court has held that some
form of pre-termination hearing must be provided to a public employee
who holds a property interest in continued employment. The purpose
of the pre-termination hearing is to be an initial check against mistaken
decisions." At this stage, the "employee is entitled to oral or written
notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's
evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.' 6 There is
no dispute that Townsel's pre-termination procedural due process rights
were satisfied when he received a Skelly hearing prior to termination."
In order to determine whether post-termination hearings satisfy
"minimal requirements of due process, 3 8 a court must balance three
39 : (1)
factors as set forth by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge
the private interest being affected by the government action; (2) the risk
that the interest is being deprived erroneously and the value, if any, of
additional safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including
administrative burdens caused by the imposition of additional procedural
requirements.'
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See id. at 236.
Loudernill,470 U.S. at 541.
See id. at 545.
See id. at 545-46.
Id. at 546 (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170-71 (1974) (Powell, J.,

concurring)).

37. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
38. Washington Teachers' Union v. Board of Educ., 107 F.3d 774, 780 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (quoting UDC Chairs Chapter v. Board of Trustees, 56 F.3d 1469, 1473 (D.C. Cir.
1995)).
39. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

40. See Washington Teachers' Union, 109 F.3d at 780 (citing Eldridge, 424 U.S.
at 335 (1976)).
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The Townsel court concluded that the appeal process as established by
the MTDB was insufficient as a post-termination hearing and held that
Townsel was entitled to a full evidentiary, trial-like hearing in which the
MTDB had the burden of proving its case against him'I Conspicuously
absent from the court's analysis is any mention, let alone application, of
the Eldridge balancing factors. Prior to the Townsel decision, no court
had concluded that public employees not subject to civil service statutes,
or other statutory schemes granting such a hearing, were entitled to full
post-termination evidentiary hearings. In fact, the California Court of
Appeal for the First District recently recognized that "[t]he [United
States Supreme] [C]ourt has never held that an employee, tenured or
otherwise, must be given a full evidentiary hearing before or after being
terminated." 42 Townsel can be distinguished from the cases on which the
court bases its decision, and a proper balancing of the Eldridge factors
does not support the Townsel court's holding. Consequently, the
holding of Townsel goes beyond the minimum requirements of posttermination procedural due process.

III. THE TOWNSEL DECISION IS DISTINGUISHABLE
There are serious flaws in the Townsel court's reasoning. First, the
court's decision is not supported by the cases it cites. While many

courts may have relied on full post-termination evidentiary hearings to
support abbreviated pre-termination procedures, no court has specifically
held that procedural due process requires a trial-like evidentiary hearing
where the government must prove its termination case.4 3 Furthermore,
nearly all of the cases primarily relied on by the Townsel court in
support of its holding are distinguishable on one of two grounds: either
the public employee being discharged was a member of the civil service
system, or the employee was entitled to a full post-termination
evidentiary hearing by virtue of some other statutory scheme. 44 Townsel,
41. See Townsel v. San Diego Metro. Transit Dev. Bd., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231, 234,
236 (Ct. App. 1998).
42. Holmes v. District Attorney, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 179 (Ct. App. 1998).
43. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1985)
(holding that the minimum process that is due is provided by a pre-termination hearing,
coupled with post-termination administrative procedures).
44. See Garraghty v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 52 F.3d 1274, 1277-79 (4th
Cir. 1995) (discussing employee subject to state grievance procedure which provided for
post-termination hearing); Egan v. Department of the Navy, 802 F.2d 1563, 1567-69
(Fed. Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) (noting termination
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therefore, can be distinguished from these cases because Townsel was
not a member of the civil service and no other statue specifically granted
him the right to a full post-termination evidentiary hearing.
A.
1.

The Townsel Decision Is Unprecedented

The Townsel Court Bases Its Holding on a "PhantomRule"

The most significant flaw in the Townsel court's reasoning is that its
holding is based on a "distilled" rule that is unsupported by case law. 5
The Court of Appeal for the Fourth District based its holding on a twoprong rule set forth in Kristal v. California State Personnel Board.6
Though the Townsel court claimed there is "ample support" for this rule,
it failed to adequately provide such support.47
Unlike Townsel, which dealt with the type of post-terminationhearing
required by procedural due process4 8 the issue before the Kristal court
was whether a tenured civil service employee could be discharged

without a pre-terminationhearing.49 Because the case was decided in

1975, the court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's 1974 decision in
Arnett v. Kennedy.
procedures governed by federal statute); Kelly v. Smith, 764 F.2d 1412, 1414-15 (11th
Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds by McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.
1994) (relying on Loudermill, which involved both a civil service employee and a
statutory right to the hearing); Coleman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 805 P.2d
300, 302 (Cal. 1991) (involving civil service employee); Figueroa v. Housing Auth., 182

Cal. Rptr. 497, 499 (Ct. App. 1982) (pointing out that employing agency was governed
by state civil service rules, but deciding case on other grounds).

The only case cited by the court that is not distinguishable on one of these two grounds
is Kadushin v. Port Authority, 603 F. Supp. 1146 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The issue in this
case, however, was significantly different than the issue addressed in Townsel. See infra
notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
45. According to the Townsel court, the rule was "distilled" from the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). See Townsel, 77
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234.
46. 123 Cal. Rptr. 512 (Ct. App. 1975), disapprovedof on other grounds by Barber
v. State Personnel Bd., 556 P.2d 306 (Cal. 1976). The Townsel court stated the rule as
follows:
[P]rocedural due process requires that where a tenured governmental employee
is to be discharged: (1) he be given notice of the charges against him or other
cause for his discharge and an opportunity to respond to the official who is to
make the decision to terminate, and (2) he be given a post-termination
evidentiary hearing within a reasonable time after his discharge with a right to
reinstatement with back pay if his discharge is found to have been without
good cause.
Townsel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234 (quoting Kristal, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 518).
47. Townsel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234.
48. See supraPart II.B.3.
49. See Kristal, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
50. 416 U.S. 134 (1974); see Kristal, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 517-18 (discussing the
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In Arnett, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the
Lloyd-LaFollette Act, which permitted federal civil service employees
removable only for cause to be discharged without a trial-type hearing.5
A plurality of the court held that procedural due process was satisfied,
however, because a statutory scheme that creates a right could specify
the manner by which the right can be terminated. 2 This concept of
"tak[ing] the bitter with the sweet,"53 was subsequently rejected,
however, in Cleveland Boardof Educationv. Loudermill.4
After an exhaustive review of the several opinions that comprise the
Supreme Court's opinion in Arnett," the Kristal court used
"[e]xtrapolation" to "predict[]" the "apparent principle" on which the
Townsel court based its holding.56 As the Kristal court explained,
Extrapolationpredicts six high court votes in favor of a rule that procedural
due process requires that where a tenured government employee is to be

discharged: (1) he be given notice of the charges against him or other cause for
his discharge and an opportunity to respond to the official who is to make the
decision to terminate, and (2) he be given a post-termination evidentiary hearing
with
within a reasonable time after his discharge with a right to reinstatement
37

back pay if his discharge is found to have been without good cause.

Significantly, the Kristal court never reached the second prong of its
predicted rule, holding that procedural due process had been violated
because no pre-terminationhearing was provided.58
The Kristal court fairly ascertained the law with respect to the first
prong of its predicted test. In 1975, it extrapolated a holding that the
Supreme Court in fact would render ten years later in Loudenmill."9 The
several opinions that make up the Supreme Court's opinion in Arnett).
51.

See Arnett,416 U.S. at 151.

52. See id. at 151-54 (Rehnquist, ., plurality opinion).
53.

Id. at 154.

54. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
55. See Kristal, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 517-18.
56. Kristal, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 518. The Kristal court, after using "[e]xtrapolation"
to "predict[]" the rule the Townsel court relied on, referred to its own rule as "the
apparentprinciple of federal constitutional law which governs in the case at bench." Id.
(emphasis added).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58.

See id. at519.

59. The Supreme Court held in Loudermill that some form of pre-termination
hearing must be provided to a public employee who holds a property interest in
continued employment. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545. The purpose of the pretermination hearing is to be an initial check against mistaken decisions. See id. at 54546. The Court held that procedural due process requires that prior to termination, a
"tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him,
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first prong of the predicted rule, however, was not at issue in Townsel.'
It was the second prong of the test that concerned the Townsel court, and
in that regard the Kristal court was only half right. The Supreme Court
has never held that absent a statutory right to such a hearing, all
permanent government employees are entitled to a post-termination
evidentiary hearing. 6' Thus, the Townsel court bases it holding on mere
dictum that can more appropriately be dubbed a "phantom rule."
2.

The CaliforniaCases CitedDo Not Support the Broad
Holding in Townsel

The Townsel court failed to provide adequate California support for
the phantom Kristalrule. It cited no cases supporting its broad holding
that procedural due process requires trial-like post-evidentiary hearings
for all permanent public employees.
In an attempt to support the Kristal rule and its own holding, the
Townsel court cited language from Coleman v. Departmentof Personnel
Administration.6 The cited language, however, does not represent the
holding of Coleman, but was taken from the dissenting portion of a
concurring and dissenting opinion.63 This minority opinion first
correctly cited Loudermill for the proposition that pre-termination
procedures consisting of only notice and an informal opportunity to
respond act merely as an initial check against mistaken decisions. 4 The
dissent then drew the following conclusion:
A post[-]termination hearing is required by due process to assure that there is a

definitive resolution of the propriety of the discharge, in a setting in which the
dismissing supervisor must bear the burden of proving to a neutral
decisionmaker that the termination rests on an accurate assessment of the
facts. 65

an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the
story." Id. at 546 (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170-71 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
60. Townsel received a pre-termination Skelly hearing, the requirements of which
mirror those set forth in Loudermill. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
61. See Holmes v. District Attorney, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 179 (Ct. App. 1998)
(recognizing that "[t]he [United States Supreme] [C]ourt has never held that an
employee, tenured or otherwise, must be given a full evidentiary hearing before or after
being terminated").
62. 805 P.2d 300 (Cal. 1991).
63. See Townsel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234-35; see also Coleman, 805 P.2d at 314-21
(Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
64. See Townsel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234; see also Coleman, 805 P.2d at 319
(Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46 (1975)).
65. Coleman, 805 P.2d at 319 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting); see
Townsel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234-35 (quoting Coleman).
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However, Loudermill did not hold that such a post-termination hearing
is required by procedural due process. 66 In Loudermill, the Supreme
Court considered the issue of what pre-termination procedures are
required by due process for public employees who can only be
discharged for cause.67 The Court concluded that "some kind of hearing"
must be provided prior to the discharge of such employees, including
notice and an opportunity to be heard.6 In establishing these minimal
pre-termination procedural requirements, the Court admitted that its
holding "rest[ed] in part on the provisions in [the Ohio civil service law]
'
While the Court may have relied
for a full post-termination hearing."69
on the post-termination evidentiary hearing provided by the Ohio civil
service statute in determining the minimal requirements for pretermination procedures, it never determined what minimal procedures
are necessary at the post-termination hearing. Clearly, those set forth in
the Ohio statute were satisfactory, 0 but there is no indication by the
Court that a full, trial-like evidentiary hearing, where the government
has the burden of proving its termination case, is requiredby procedural
due process absent a statute granting such a hearing.
Nevertheless, the Townsel court attempted to give credence to the
Coleman dissent's misplaced conclusion, and thus provide support for
the Kristal rule, by claiming that the dissent's conclusion was adopted
by the Coleman majority.7' The court asserted that the Coleman
majority "apparently agreed" with the dissent because it said:
"[U]nlike an employee who is discharged for cause, an employee who has been
determined to have resigned under the [absent without leave] statute does not
the
have a due process right to a post-severance evidentiary hearing at which
72

state must prove the facts supporting the determination of resignation."
66.

See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (holding

that some form of pre-termination hearing is necessary before discharging a public
employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in continued
employment).
67. See id. at 535.
68. See id. at 546 (citing Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 1267, 1281 (1975)).
69. Id.
70. The Ohio statute called for providing the dismissed employee with the reasons
for his removal, and the ability to file a written appeal. See id. at 539 n.6. According to
the statute, if such an appeal is filed, a "trial board" is appointed to hear the appeal with
the power to "affirm, disaffirm, or modify" the termination decision. Id. Either side
then has the right to obtain review of the final decision in state court. See id.
71. See Townsel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235.
72. Id. (quoting Coleman, 805 P.2d at 309) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)
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When analyzed carefully, this language fails to support the Coleman

dissent, the Kristal dictum, or consequently, the Townsel court's
holding.
First, the issue in Coleman was whether a state must provide
procedural safeguards when exercising its statutory authority to treat an
unexcused absent tenured civil service employee as "automatically
resign[ed]."7
The court addressed both pre-termination and posttermination procedures. 4 Significantly, the court determined that with
regard to post-termination procedures, no evidentiary hearing was
required for employees deemed to have constructively resigned.75 The
court did not, however, express any opinion as to what minimal posttermination procedures are required when discharging a public employee
who can only be terminated for cause.
Second, in the heart of the language constituting the Coleman court's
"apparent agreement" with the dissent, the majority cites both Skelly v.
77
State Personnel Board76 and Kirkpatrick v. Civil Service Commission
for their recognition that permanent civil service employees have a
statutory right to a post-termination evidentiary hearing. 78 Notably, the
Townsel court was cognizant of this recognition, for it made reference to
it in a footnote immediately following the cited language of the Coleman
majority. 79 The fact that both the Coleman court and the Townsel court
felt it necessary to point out that civil service employees have a statutory
right to a post-termination evidentiary hearing is significant, because it
reinforces the fact that no court has declared that, absent such a statutory
right, a permanent employee has a procedural due process right to a full
post-termination evidentiary hearing.
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Coleman court actually
discussed the Kristal decision." In characterizing the holding of the
case, however, the court did not even mention post-termination
requirements. Instead, it correctly observed that the Kristal holding was

limited to the nature of pre-terminationprocedural protections." If the
Coleman majority was truly endorsing the dissent's sweeping argument,
and thus supporting the phantom Kristal rule, there should have been
(first alteration in original).
73. Coleman, 805 P.2d at 302.
74. See id. at 309.
75. See id.

76.
77.
78.
79.

539 P.2d 774 (Cal. 1975).
144 Cal. Rptr. 51 (Ct. App. 1978).
See Coleman, 805 P.2d at 309.
See Townsel v. San Diego Metro. Transit Dev. Bd., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231, 235

n.3 (Ct. App. 1998).
80. See Coleman, 805 P.2d at 312-13.
81. See id.

1122

[VOL. 36: 1109, 1999]

Townsel
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

some mention of the rule somewhere in the majority's fifteen-page
opinion. No such reference exists.
In support of both the Kristal rule and its own holding, the Townsel
court also cited Figueroa v. Housing Authority.2 As the Townsel court
pointed out, in Figueroa the permanent employee was terminated
without a pre-termination hearing, but was given a post-termination
hearing in which the government agency did not produce evidence
supporting the employee's discharge." According to the Townsel court,
the court in Figueroa responded to the government's claim that its posttermination hearing satisfied the requirements of Skelly by arguing that
"[e]ven if the hearing Figueroa received would have satisfied the
minimal requirements for pretermination notification of charges and
opportunity to respond, it would not appear to satisfy the due process
requirements for an evidentiary hearing at some point.' '
The cited language is dicta contained in a footnote." The narrow
constitutional issue the court dealt with was "confined" to "the single
question whether Figueroa had a property right in his employment such
as to require due process upon termination."' The court never addressed
what minimal post-termination procedural requirements are necessary
when discharging permanent public employees. For the first time during
oral argument to the Court of Appeal, the government claimed that any
remedy to which Figueroa was entitled should be limited to back pay
from when he was dismissed to the date of the alleged Skelly hearing. 7
It was this contention that prompted the retort from the court-a retort
that holds no precedential value.
Even if one disagrees with the contention that the Figueroalanguage
holds no precedential value, any persuasive value provided by the
court's dicta cuts in a direction favorable to the arguments being
presented in this Casenote. First, the court speculated that the hearing
provided would not "appear" to satisfy procedural due process. This
language supports the notion that no minimal boundary has been
established with regard to the procedural due process requirements at the
82.

182 Cal. Rptr. 497 (Ct. App. 1982).

83.

See Townsel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235; Figueroa,182 Cal. Rptr. at 498.

84. Townsel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235 (quoting Figueroa,182 Cal. Rptr. at 499 n.1)
(emphasis omitted).
85.
86.
87.
88.

See Figueroa,182 Cal. Rptr. at 499 n.1.
Id. at 499.
Seeid. at499n.1.
Id.
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post-termination stage of discharging a permanent public employee.
Further, the Figueroa court's observation, if given weight, merely
suggests that such minimal post-termination procedures include a
requirement that the government present evidence in support of its
decision to terminate the employee. Arguably, this indirectly supports
the Kristal court's conclusion that some post-termination evidentiary
hearing is necessary. Nonetheless, there is no support for the Townsel
court's unprecedented holding that such a hearing must be a full, triallike evidentiary hearing where the government has the burden of proving
its termination case.
3.

The Federal Cases Cited Do Not Support the Broad
Holding in Townsel

The Townsel court also attempted to provide support for its holding by
citing several federal cases." Notably, the court cited no Supreme Court
case as direct support for its holding. Instead, it relied entirely on lower
federal court cases. Like their California counterparts, these cases fall
short of supporting the Townsel court's holding that a full posttermination hearing is requiredby procedural due process for all public
employees.
The court first cited Kelly v. Smith" for its language that "the
assurance that a full evidentiary hearing will be forthcoming is one of
the primary reasons for allowing the abbreviated pretermination
procedures."'" The Kelly court cited Loudermill for this proposition. 92
As noted earlier, however, Loudermill, while relying on a statutorily

created

post-termination

process

to

determine

pre-termination

requirements, did not hold that a full post-termination evidentiary
hearing was required by procedural due process.93
It is also significant that the Eleventh Circuit in Kelly also did not hold
that such a hearing was required. In evaluating the post-termination
89. See Townsel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235-36 (citing Kelly v. Smith, 764 F.2d 1412
(IIth Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds by McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th
Cir. 1994)); Garraghty v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 52 F.3d 1274 (4th Cir. 1995);
Egan v. Department of the Navy, 802 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 484 U.S. 518 (1988); Kadushin v. Port Auth., 603 F. Supp. 1146 (E.D.N.Y.
1985).
90. 764 F.2d 1412 (llth Cir. 1985).
91. Townsel, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235 (quoting Kelly v. Smith, 764 F.2d 1412, 1415
(1 Ith Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds by McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th

Cir. 1994)).
92. See Kelly, 764 F.2d at 1415 (citing Cleveland Bd.of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 546 (1985)).
93. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (explaining the Loudernill
holding).
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hearing provided to Kelly, the court was concerned with ensuring a "full,
fair and impartial resolution." 4 The only post-termination hearing Kelly
received was an informal conference with a manager, prompting the
court to conclude that such an "informal meeting... was not sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process."'95 While perhaps
adding an element of formality to the minimum requirements for posttermination due process, the Kelly decision does not imply, let alone
stand, for the proposition that procedural due process requires a full
post-termination evidentiary hearing for all public employees.
The Townsel court also cited the following language from Garraghty
9 6:
v. Virginia Departmentof Corrections
"'The severity of depriving a person [with a property interest in continued

employment] of the means of livelihood requires that such a person have at least
one opportunity' for a full hearing, which includes the right to 'call witnesses
and produce evidence
in his own behalf,' and to 'challenge the factual basis for
97
the state's action."'

While not rising to the level of "ample," Garraghty is perhaps the
Townsel court's best support for the Kristal rule. 9' Even conceding
arguendo that Garraghty supports the Kristal court's conclusion that
some evidentiary hearing is required after termination, it provides no
support for the Townsel court's unprecedented holding that procedural
due process entitles all permanent employees to full, trial-like
evidentiary hearings where the government must prove its termination
case, regardless of whether the employee is a member of the civil
service or entitled to such a hearing by virtue of some other statute.
Like the previous cases cited by the Townsel court, Garraghty does
not address the issue of what procedures are necessary at the posttermination stage of a permanent employee's discharge. The relevant
language cited by the Townsel court arises in the context of the court's
consideration of the defendants' "final argument," which the Garraghty
court characterized as an argument "that [defendants were] entitled to
qualified immunity because they were only responsible for providing
94. Kelly, 764 F.2d at 1415.
95. Id. at 1416.
96. 52 F.3d 1274 (4th Cir. 1995).
97. Townsel v. San Diego Metro. Transit Dev. Bd., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231, 235 (Ct.
App. 1998) (quoting Garraghty v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 52 F.3d at 1284

(quoting Carter v. Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Ctr., 767 F.2d 270, 273 (6th
Cir. 1985))).
98.

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Garraghty with pretermination process and that process satisfied the
notice and hearing requirements of Loudermill." In concluding that the
defendants were not immune from liability, the court recognized that the

post-termination hearing provided to Garraghty was procedurally
deficient because he was not given the opportunity to confront and
examine witnesses.2
Like Kelly, therefore, Garraghty merely adds an element to the
minimum requirements of a post-termination hearing for a permanent
public employee-the ability to confront and examine witnesses.'0 '
While perhaps helping to narrow what is required at the post-termination
phase of procedural due process, the Garraghty language cited by the
Townsel court does nothing further. For this reason, it is insufficient as
support for the Townsel court's broad assertion that procedural due

process requires that all public employees receive a full, trial-like
hearing where the government must prove its case against the discharged

employee.
The Townsel court also pointed out that Egan v. Department of the
Navy102 "cited Loudermill and Arnett for the proposition that 'federal
employee due process requires a full evidentiary hearing at some point

in the termination proceedings, if not before removal, then after..". As
previously discussed, neither Loudermill nor Arnett stand for this
proposition."4 More importantly however, the Egan court's language, in
context, supports the conclusion that outside a statutory right to such a
hearing, no court has held that procedural due process entities all
permanent public employees to a full, trial-like post-termination
evidentiary hearing. Consider the entirety of the court's language:
The procedure designed by the [Merit Systems Protection] Board, which the
Board characterizes as "minimum due process", is a departure from the Civil
Service Reform Act's careful balance of employer and employee interests. This
procedure would evict a large class of federal employees from the statutory
safeguardsthat this Act provides. Minimum due process under this Act requires
not only minimal pre-termination procedures, but also requires a posttermination hearing as provided in 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1). As discussed in

99. Garraghty,52 F.3d at 1283.
100. See id. at 1284.
101. In this respect, the author does not question the implications of Garraghtynor
Kelly. In one of the landmark procedural due process cases, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970), the Supreme Court held that due process usually requires an opportunity to
confront and examine adverse witnesses (the implication of Garraghty) and an
opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision-maker (the implication of Kelly). See
id. at 269-71.
102. 802 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
103. Townsel v. San Diego Metro. Transit Dev. Bd., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231, 235 (Ct.
App. 1998) (citation omitted) (quoting Egan, 802 F.2d at 1572, rev'd on other grounds,

484 U.S. 518 (1988)).

104. See supra Part IM.A.1.
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Arnett v. Kennedy, federal employee due process requires a full evidentiary
hearing at05some point in the termination proceedings, if not before removal,
then after.

The Egan court apparently considered the right to a full evidentiary
hearing as one conferred by statute. This point is made stronger when it
is recalled that Arnett itself dealt with a federal civil service employee
granted certain post-termination procedural rights by virtue of the Lloyd
LaFollette Act."' The fact that the Egan court's reference to Arnett is in
the context of "federal employees" only, and that it immediately follows
the discussion of comparable statutes granting federal employees the
right to a full evidentiary hearing, is a strong indication of the limited
nature of its language. The court was not suggesting, let alone holding,
that all permanent public employees must be granted a full posttermination evidentiary hearing because such a right is required by
constitutional procedural due process. Thus, the Townsel court again
failed in its attempt to provide support for such a holding.
Finally, the Townsel court relied on the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York's opinion in Kadushin v. Port
Authority."7 However, that case provides little support for the Townsel
holding. After discussing whether procedural due process required that
Kadushin be afforded a post-termination evidentiary hearing, the court
made the following remarks:
[A]lthough... defendant was not required to supply plaintiff with a pretermination evidentiary hearing, defendant was required to supply plaintiff with
(at the least) a post-termination evidentiary hearing before an impartial
tribunal .... [W]e note that defendant did not supply plaintiff with any
evidentiary hearing whatsoever, before or after the termination, and hold that
defendant has therefore deprived plaintiff of property without dueI03 process, in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This language indicates that the operative issue addressed by the
Kadushin court was whether procedural due process required that a post-

105.

Egan, 802 F.2d at 1572 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). According to the

statute, federal employees have a right "to a hearing for which a transcript will be kept."

5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1) (1994).
106. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)

(indicating that the Lloyd LaFollette Act grants federal employees a statutory right to a
full evidentiary hearing).
107. 603 F. Supp. 1146 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
108. Id. at 1151 (original emphasis omitted) (emphasis added); see Townsel, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 235-36 (quoting language from Kadushin).
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termination hearing be provided.'O This was not the issue in Townsel.
There was no question in Townsel as to whether Townsel received a
post-evidentiary hearing-the issue before the court was what type of
post-termination hearing was required by procedural due process.1
Therefore, while supportive of the Kelly case,"' Kadushin provides no
support for the Townsel holding.
B.

The Importance of DistinguishingTownsel

As pointed out above, nearly all of the cases cited by the Townsel
court are distinguishable on one of two grounds: either the public
employee was a member of the civil service system, or the employee
was granted a full post-termination evidentiary hearing by some other
statutory scheme."' The Townsel court overlooked the importance of
such a distinction.
Though absent from the Townsel court's analysis, determining the
minimum requirements for post-termination procedural due process
requires a balancing of the three factors set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge."3 Whether or not the employee has a statutory right to a posttermination evidentiary hearing has a significant impact on this
balancing test. The third factor in the test considers the administrative
burdens imposed by additional procedural safeguards." 4 In terms of the
Townsel case, the inquiry includes looking at the administrative burdens
imposed by requiring a full, trial-like evidentiary hearing.
However, such an inquiry is not necessary in cases involving civil
service employees or other employees granted a statutory right to full,
trial-like evidentiary hearings. This is true because by granting the right
to such hearings in statutes, legislatures have determined that they are
not burdensome on the employing agency. In other words, where a
statute requires particular procedures, the Eldridge balancing test does
not take into account the burden of those procedures on the
government."' Thus, in a case cited by the Townsel court, the United
109. See Kadushin, 603 F. Supp. at 1151 (indicating that the question at issue was
whether defendant should have provided plaintiff with a post-termination evidentiary
hearing).

110. See discussion supra Part Il.B.3.
111. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (explaining that Kelly can be

read as indicating that at a minimum, a post-termination hearing must be before an
impartial decision-maker).
112. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
113. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). For a discussion of the three factors, see supra note 40
and accompanying text.
114. See Eldridge,424 U.S. at 335.
115. It is important not to confuse this point with the plurality opinion's "bitter with
the sweet" analysis in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). According to that
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States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found "it... hard to see
how [the administrative burden caused by additional procedures] can be
too great, in view of the fact that [Virginia] provides
this opportunity to
' 16
all employees covered by the Personnel Act."
Unlike the cases where the legislature has already determined that

there is no burden in providing full post-termination evidentiary
hearings, requiring municipal agencies, such as the MTDB, to provide
such hearings is contrary to the public interest and creates administrative
burdens that upset the balance contemplated by Eldridge.
IV. THE MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGEFACTORS

As discussed in Part II, in order to determine whether a posttermination hearing satisfies the requirements of due process, a court
must balance the following factors: (1) the private interest being affected
by the government action; (2) the risk that the interest is being deprived
erroneously and the value, if any, of additional safeguards; and (3) the
public interest, including any burdens caused by the imposition of
additional procedural requirements. ' 7 The Townsel court's requirement
for a full, trial-like post-evidentiary hearing where the government must
analysis, because a legislature was creating a property interest, it could at the same time
define the procedures by which that property interest could be taken away. See id. at
151-54 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). The analysis was rejected in Cleveland Board
of Education v. Loudermill,470 U.S. 532 (1985), which held that once a property interest
was created, its deprivation was subject to constitutional, not statutory, procedural

requirements. See id. at 541.
Concluding that a statutory right to a full, trial-like post-termination evidentiary
hearing eliminates consideration of administrative burdens imposed by such a hearing is
consistent with Loudermill. In rejecting Arnett's plurality opinion, Loudermill was
concerned with legislatures creating statutory procedures that were insufficient to protect
due process rights. See id. at 541. Statutory grants to full, trial-like post-evidentiary
hearings, however, meet minimal constitutional procedural due process standards.
Furthermore, by granting such hearings, legislatures are not engaging in defining what
procedures are constitutionally necessary-they are merely providing safeguards in
addition to those required by the Constitution. More importantly, consideration of the
administrative burdens created by additional procedures is a constitutional analysis
engaged in to determine whether such procedures are required. It is unnecessary to
undertake such an analysis when those procedures are provided for by statute, because
legislatures can impose requirements that exceed minimal constitutional protections.
116. Garraghty v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 52 F.3d 1274, 1283 (4th Cir.
1995); see Townsel v. San Diego Metro. Transit Dev. Bd., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231, 235 (Ct.
App. 1998) (citing Garraghty).
117. See Washington Teachers' Union v. Board of Educ., 109 F.3d 774, 780 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (citing Eldridge,424 U.S. at 335).
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affirmatively prove its discharge case exceeds the minimal requirements
of post-termination procedural due process. A proper balancing of the
Eldridge factors reveals that the post-termination hearing suggested by
the Townsel court goes beyond the "appropriate procedural safeguards"

contemplated by the Supreme Court."'
A.

The PrivateInterest at Stake

The private interest at stake in the Townsel case was Rodric Townsel's
continued employment with the San Diego Metropolitan Transit
Development Board. This interest is a substantial one. The Supreme

Court has recognized the "severity of depriving someone of his or her
livelihood."" 9 According to the Court, the "significance of the private
interest in retaining employment cannot be gainsaid."'"' Such a view has

been widely recognized.'
It is significant that Townsel was facing termination, and not merely a
temporary suspension without pay." Deprivation of his employment, if
upheld, was to be permanent. The finality of the deprivation of the
private interest at stake must be taken into account when determining
what process is due.' 3 Though significant, however, Townsel's interest

in continued employment is not as high as other private interests. For
example, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 24 the Supreme Court held that
comprehensive procedures were required before terminating the private
interest in continued welfare payments."z The court reasoned that unlike
"the discharged government employee," terminating welfare benefits
deprives "an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live."'"
118. Loudennill, 470 U.S. at 541 (quoting Arnett, 416 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in result in part)).
119. FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 243 (1988); see Brock v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 263 (1987); Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543.
120. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543.
121. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997) (pointing out that
Supreme Court opinions have "recognized the severity of depriving someone of the
means of his livelihood"); Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 263 (1987)
(stating employee's interest in retaining job is substantial); DeMichele v. Greenburgh
Cent. Sch. Dist., 167 F.3d 784, 791 (2d Cir. 1999) (declaring employee's interest in
tenured teaching position is substantial); Garraghty,52 F.3d at 1282 (noting interest in
continued employment is a substantive right); Texas Faculty Ass'n v. University of
Texas, 946 F.2d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Loudermill).
122. See Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 932 (distinguishing between termination and
temporary suspension in consideration of procedural due process requirements).
123. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434 (1982) (taking into
account both the length and the finality of the deprivation in determining what process is
due).
124. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
125. See id. at 264.
126. Id.
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Townsel, however, does not find himself in such a dire situation by
virtue of his termination. Not only are temporary programs such as
welfare and unemployment compensation available to provide him with
"the means for daily subsistence,"' 27 but Townsel also has the ability to
find other work.
Since "'[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands,"" Townsel's interest in
continued employment can be adequately protected by procedural
safeguards less comprehensive than those provided in Goldberg. There
is no question that the Townsel court's requirement for a full, trial-like
evidentiary hearing where the MTDB must prove its termination case
sufficiently safeguards Townsel's interest in continued employment.
Whether procedural due process demands such a hearing, however,
requires that Townsel's private interest be balanced against the
remaining two factors.
B.

The Risk of ErroneousDecisionsand the Value of
AdditionalProcedures

The second factor in the Eldridge balancing test looks at the risk of
erroneously depriving a person of a property interest. To properly
balance this factor, it is necessary to consider both the procedures made
available to Townsel by the MTDB, and the value, if any, provided by
the additional procedures required by the California Court of Appeal for
the Fourth District.
1.

The ProceduresProvided by the MTDB

It is not entirely clear from the Townsel decision exactly what posttermination procedures were provided to Townsel by the MTDB.
Furthermore, there is a conflict between the claims made by the parties
in their respective briefs. Townsel claims that he was refused any type
of post-termination evidentiary hearing,' 2 while the MTDB claims that
Townsel did receive a post-termination hearing "that spanned two

127.
128.

Id.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer,

408 U.S. 471,481 (1972)).
129. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Townsel v. San Diego Metro. Transit Dev.
Bd., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231 (Ct. App. 1998) (No. D 026485).
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days."'' ° Since this Casenote seeks to identify the minimum posttermination procedural due process requirements, it assumes that the
claims made by the MTDB are accurate. Thus, it is first necessary to
examine what procedures the MTDB claims to have provided.
The MTDB Administrative Code permits employees to appeal
personnel decisions to the MTDB Board of Directors.' In response to
Townsel's request, the Board of Directors appointed a three-member
committee to hear an appeal.3 2 Townsel was represented by counsel and
both sides were permitted to submit a pre-hearing brief.133 During the
hearing, he was "given the opportunity to make whatever statements or
arguments [he and his lawyer] felt were necessary to convince the
committee that Townsel's termination was in error."' 34 Additionally, the

MTDB provided evidence to the committee in the form of a report
presented by MTDB's counsel.'35 Though he was "allowed to testify and
had the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence,"'36 there is
no indication that Townsel was permitted to confront and examine
adverse witnesses.
2.

The Risk of an ErroneousDecision

Given Townsel's significant interest in continued employment, the
procedural protections provided by the MTDB must be evaluated in light
of the risk that Townsel's termination was erroneous. The courts have
provided some limited guidance as to the minimum post-termination
procedural requirements necessary to avert an erroneous deprivation of a
significant private interest.
First, the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island
has recognized that "there can be no doubt that the opportunity for the
employee to present his side of the story prior to termination may
37
significantly reduce the risk of [an] erroneous [government] action."'
Townsel was provided such opportunity by virtue of his pre-termination
Skelly hearing. By providing notice and an opportunity to respond, pretermination hearings such as Skelly hearings are intended to be an initial

130.
131.

Respondent's Brief at 15, Townsel (No. D 026485).
See id. at 9 (referencing MTDB Administrative Code and Regulations §

3.2.10).
132. See id. at 10.
133.

See id. at 9.

134.

Id. at 10.

135.

See Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Townsel (No. D 026485).

136.
137.

Respondent's Brief at 15-16, Townsel (No. D 026485).
DelSignore v.DiCenzo, 767 F. Supp. 423, 427 (D.R.I. 1991) (emphasis added)
(citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985)).
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check against mistaken decisions.'38
Though Loudermill dealt with pre-termination procedural
requirements, in that case the Supreme Court pointed out that "some
opportunity for the employee to present his side of the case is recurringly
of obvious value in reaching an accurate decision."'39 This observation,
however, can be equally applied in the post-termination context. Since
Townsel was allowed to present both witnesses and other favorable
evidence during his post-termination hearing before the appeals
committee, he was clearly given an opportunity to present his side of the
story.
Several other factors have also been identified as minimum
requirements for a post-termination hearing. For instance, several U.S.

Circuit Courts of Appeal have held that such a hearing must be before an
impartial tribunal.'40 Townsel was accorded such impartiality because
the MTDB provided him a hearing in front of a neutral committee that
reported to an equally neutral appeals board. Additionally, a formality
requirement and a requirement that the government present evidence in
support of its decision to terminate have both been identified as
necessary components of post-termination procedural due process."'
The appeals process established by the MTDB was a formal one. Parties
submitted pre-hearing briefs, were represented by counsel, had the
opportunity to present witnesses, could introduce favorable evidence,
and responded to direct inquiries by the appeals board. In addition, the
MTDB's counsel presented evidence to the appeals committee in
support of its decision to discharge Townsel.'42 Thus, these additional
requirements were also satisfied by the MTDB.
138. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46.
139. Id. at 543.
140. See, e.g., Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 518 (10th Cir.
1998) ("A fundamental principle of procedural due process is a hearing before an
impartial tribunal."); Clements v. Airport Auth., 69 F.3d 321, 333 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that due process requires hearing before an impartial tribunal); Riggins v. Board
of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 790 F.2d 707, 712 (8th Cir. 1986) (recognizing hearing
before an impartial board or tribunal as requirement of due process); Yashon v. Hunt,
825 F.2d 1016, 1026-27 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988) (holding that
due process entitles a person to have his case heard before a neutral tribunal).
141. See Kelly v. Smith, 764 F.2d 1412, 1416 (11th Cir. 1985), overruled on other
grounds by McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that informal
hearings do not satisfy procedural due process); Figueroa v. Housing Auth., 182 Cal.
Rptr. 497, 498-500 (Ct. App. 1982) (implying that evidence be presented to support the

government's decision to discharge).
142. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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One final requirement has been identified as a minimum requirement
for post-termination hearings-the ability to confront and examine
adverse witnesses. 43 This requirement is of particular importance in the
Townsel case because Townsel's discharge was based on factual
information regarding his conduct as an MTDB employee. Without the
ability to confront and examine adverse witnesses in such a case where
factual allegations are disputed, the risk of an erroneous termination is
high. Thus, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has declared
that "[a] 'full post-termination hearing' is understood to include.., the
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses."'" Although Townsel had the
opportunity to call his own witnesses, there is no indication that he was
given an opportunity to confront and examine adverse witnesses. For
this reason, the post-termination hearing granted by the MTDB failed to
provide Townsel with the minimal procedural safeguards required by
45

due process.'
3.

The Value of the Additional ProceduresRequired
by the Townsel Court

The issue in Townsel could have been resolved at this point, had the
Townsel court applied the Eldridge balancing test. However, the court
went on to declare that procedural due process requires a full, trial-like
evidentiary hearing where the government must prove its termination
case for all permanent public employees regardless of whether they are
members of the civil service or
are granted such hearings by virtue of
6
some other statutory scheme.'
Indirectly, the Townsel court's holding suggests several additional
requirements that are necessary to satisfy post-termination procedural
due process. Those additional safeguards include a burden on the
government to affirmatively prove its termination case, and the necessity
to subpoena witnesses and compel their testimony.'47 In order to
143. See Garraghty v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 52 F.3d 1274, 1283-84 (4th.
Cir. 1995) (rejecting sufficiency of post-termination hearing because terminated
employee was not provided opportunity to confront and examine adverse witnesses).
144. Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475,480 (10th Cir. 1994).
145. Part IV of this Casenote argues that procedural due process does not require
that the MTDB subpoena witnesses. See infra Part IV.C.I.b. These two conclusions are
not inconsistent. Although requiring the MTDB to subpoena witnesses imposes a burden
on the public interest, this is only true for witnesses unaffiliated with the MTDB. Thus,
Townsel could have been provided the opportunity to confront managers, co-workers, or
other adverse MTDB witnesses without burdening the public interest. Since this was not
done, procedural due process was not satisfied.
146. See Townsel v. San Diego Metro Transit Dev. Bd., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231, 236

(Ct. App. 1998).
147. See id. at 236-37.
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determine whether these additional safeguards are required by
procedural due process, however, they must be weighed against the final
factor in the Eldridge balancing test.
C. The Public Interest,Including the Burdens Imposed by
Additional Procedures
Had the Townsel court properly engaged in balancing the three
Eldridge factors, it could have concluded that Townsel's procedural due
process rights were violated without broadly holding that all permanent
public employees are entitled to full, trial-like post-evidentiary hearings
regardless of whether they are members of the civil service or are
granted such hearings by virtue of some other statutory scheme. Where
not already provided for by civil service laws or other statutory schemes,
requiring a burden on the government to affirmatively prove its
termination case, and the necessity to subpoena witnesses and compel
testimony weighs heavily on the public interest. Not only do such
requirements fail to provide significant additional value to the
procedures already in place, but they unnecessarily increase the cost of
public employment and threaten the quality and nature of public
employment. As a result, those additional safeguards contemplated by
the Townsel court exceed the minimal requirements of post-termination
procedural due process.
1.

Public Burdens Imposed by the Townsel Court's
Additional Procedures

The additional procedural safeguards imposed by the Townsel court

create significant burdens on the public interest. As a result, they exceed
minimal constitutional procedural due process requirements.
To
evaluate those additional procedural safeguards, any value they provide
to ensuring an accurate decision must be weighed against the burden
they impose on the public interest.
a. Placingthe Burden ofProofon the Government
Few courts have addressed the constitutionality of placing the burden
of showing lack of just cause upon a discharged public employee.
Recently, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
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Circuit answered the question in Benavidez v. Albuquerque48 by
applying the Eldridge balancing test.149 The court concluded that putting
the burden of proof on the discharged employee during the posttermination hearing did not violate procedural due process. 5 Similarly,
applying the balancing test to Townsel results in the conclusion that
placing the burden of proof on the government during the posttermination hearing is not required by procedural due process.
Like the interest in Townsel, the Tenth Circuit recognized a significant
private interest in retaining employment.'5' As to the second factor, the
court evaluated the need for placing the burden of proof on the
government in light of the pre-termination procedures provided to the
discharged employee.'52 The court concluded:
When the pre-termination process offers little or no opportunity for the
employee to present his side of the case ....
a post-termination hearing
represents the only meaningful opportunity the employee has to challenge the
employer's action, and requiring a dismissed employee to prove in this context
that he was terminated
without just cause may increase the risk of an erroneous
153
deprivation.

Thus, had Townsel been denied a meaningful opportunity to challenge
the MTDB's action before termination, requiring the MTDB to prove its
case after termination would admittedly reduce the risk of an erroneous
decision. However, Townsel's Skelly hearing provided him with such a
meaningful opportunity.
As required by law, prior to his termination, Townsel was given notice
of the possibility he would be terminated, the reasons for the proposed
action, a copy of the specific charges against him, and the right to
respond either orally or in writing."" The Tenth Circuit referred to
nearly identical procedures as "extensive.' ' 155 As pointed out by the

Tenth Circuit,
when the employee has had a meaningful opportunity to explain his position
and challenge his dismissal in pre-termination proceedings, the importance of
the procedures in post-termination hearing is not as great. In this type of posttermination hearing, simply giving the employee "some opportunity" to present
his side of the case "will provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous

148. 101 F.3d 620 (10th Cir. 1996).
149. See id. at 625-26.
150. See id. at 627-28.
151. See id. at 626.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
155. See Benavidez, 101 F.3d at 627. The procedures provided in that case included
written notice of the hearing and alleged violations, the ability to respond orally or in
writing, and the right to retain counsel. See id.
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action."1

56

Therefore, the pre-termination procedures provided to Townsel
significantly reduced the risk of an erroneous decision at the posttermination hearing. Because the risk of error was minimized, Townsel

was only entitled to "some opportunity" to present his side of the story.
Thus, requiring the MTDB to affirmatively prove its case was
constitutionally unnecessary.
Not only does requiring the MTDB to prove its termination case add
little to no value to the procedures already provided Townsel, but such a
requirement also imposes administrative burdens on the government.
Admittedly, placing the burden of proof on the MTDB would not require
additional hearings or investigation. A post-termination hearing is
already required by MTDB procedures and, in order to get to that stage,
the MTDB would have already compiled evidence in support of its
decision to terminate. Nonetheless, any city has a strong interest in
maintaining a competent workforce. The inability to efficiently remove
problem employees would not only increase the cost of public
employment, but would also result in poorly run government operations,
such as the San Diego Trolley. As the Supreme Court has observed, it is
a "common-sense realization that government offices could not function
if every employment decision became a constitutional matter."'57
A proper balancing of the Eldridge factors therefore reveals that
placing the burden on the MTDB to prove its case at the posttermination hearing was not required by procedural due process. By
requiring this additional procedural safeguard, the Townsel court not
only failed to reduce the risk of an erroneous decision, but also imposed
administrative burdens upon the MTDB. Contrary to the court's
holding, procedural due process does not require in all cases that the
government prove its termination case during the post-termination phase
of discharging a permanent public employee.

b. The Necessity to Subpoena Witnesses and Compel Their Testimony
Similar to the issue of burden of proof, requiring the MTDB to
156.

Id. at 626 (quoting Cleveland Bd.of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543

n.8 (1985)).
157. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989)
(quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 143 (1983))).
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subpoena witnesses adds little value to the procedures already in place,
and imposes an administrative burden on the public interest. As a result,
there is no procedural due process requirement that such a safeguard be
provided in all cases.

The right to confront adverse witnesses has been identified as a
necessary component of post-termination procedural due process."' This
requirement can be met, however, without the government employer
issuing subpoenas, especially when the testimony of third-party
witnesses adds little to the accuracy of the termination decision. In cases
where the dismissal charges are solely based on factual allegations made
by third-party witnesses, subpoenaing those witness is arguably
necessary to insure the discharged employee's ability to confront and
examine adverse witnesses. Townsel's dismissal, however, was not
"solely or even primarily"'59 based on the battery charges arising from
the March 5, 1994 incident.' 6
According to the MTDB's general manager, Townsel was being
discharged not for allegedly assaulting trolley passengers, but for
violating several MTDB rules in connection with the incident. 6'
Moreover, Townsel's alleged assault on two female San Diego Trolley
passengers "was just one in a long series of well documented problems
Mr. Townsel had in dealing with the public, co-workers and supervisory
staff."' 62 Townsel had a history of engendering complaints and violating
MTDB rules.' 63 Thus, there was arguably sufficient cause to discharge
Townsel without the testimony of the two female passengers. However,
even if the MTDB relied in part on the passengers' testimony, the
Supreme Court has recognized that property interests can
be
64
constitutionally terminated even when based on hearsay evidence.
Not only is the subpoenaing of third-party witnesses constitutionally
158. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
159. Respondent's Brief at 9, Townsel v. San Diego Metro. Transit Dev. Bd., 77
Cal. Rptr. 2d 231 (Ct. App. 1998) (No. D 026485) (quoting Letter from Thomas Larwin,
MTDB General Manager, to Rodric Townsel (Mar. 31, 1995) (explaining the reasons for
Townsel's discharge)).
160. For a review of the facts of the incident, see supra note 9 and accompanying

text.

161. See Respondent's Brief at 9, Townsel (No. D 026485) (discussing Letter from
Thomas Larwin, MTDB General Manager, to Rodric Townsel (Mar. 31, 1995)
(explaining the reasons for Townsel's discharge)).

162. Id. at 9 (quoting Letter from Thomas Larwin, MTDB General Manager, to
Rodric Townsel (Mar. 31, 1995) (explaining the reasons for Townsel's discharge)); see
supra note 9 (describing additional incidents in Townsel's employment history).
163. See Respondent's Brief at 3-5, Townsel (No. D026485) (describing in detail
Townsel's employment history); see also supra note 9 (highlighting some of Townsel's
employment history).
164. See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402-10 (1971) (allowing the
termination of Social Security benefits based on hearsay evidence).
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unnecessary, but such a requirement would fail to add any value to the

procedures already in place. Subpoenaing witnesses arguably protects
against an arbitrary or capricious decision, but the government has an
incentive not to arbitrarily discharge public employees. Doing so would
increase the cost of public employment because of the necessity to find,
hire, and train new employees.'65 Even if the possibility of an arbitrary
dismissal exists, there are mechanisms already in place to alleviate such
a risk.
MTDB employees could only be removed for cause.
Necessarily, something more than caprice was needed to discharge
Townsel. In addition, he was provided a pre-termination hearing
intended to act as an initial check against an erroneous decision. Finally,
Townsel was given the opportunity to present his side of the story in
front of an impartial review board. These procedures weigh heavily
against an arbitrary or capricious discharge.
Most importantly, the MTDB could have easily satisfied Townsel's
right to confront adverse witnesses by allowing him to question MTDB
personnel. Since Townsel's dismissal was based on rule violations
stemming from a history of complaints, Townsel should have had the
opportunity to question his manager, supervisors, and other MTDB
employees upon whose testimony the MTDB relied.
Unlike
subpoenaing third-party witnesses, providing Townsel with this
opportunity would have satisfied the minimal requirements of
procedural due process without imposing an administrative burden on
the MTDB.
Requiring internal personnel to appear at a post-termination hearing
imposes little burden on the MTDB. Compelling the appearance of such
witnesses could be done quickly and easily without burdening the
MTDB financially. Requiring the MTDB to subpoena third-party
witnesses, however, imposes considerable burden upon the MTDB.
First, time, effort, and money must be expended to locate third-party

witnesses. More importantly, requiring such a procedure in all cases
would greatly impact the government's interest in maintaining a
competent work force. The termination process would become timeconsuming and costly. This would not only reduce the government's
ability to quickly discharge problem employees such as Townsel, but
would also increase the overall cost of public employment. If small
165. See generally Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U.
Cm. L. REV. 947 (1984) (discussing the marketplace economic disincentives for firing
employees without cause).
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municipal government agencies such as the MTDB were forced to
comply with such broad post-termination procedures, it may even lead to
a reduction of permanent or tenured public employment, since such
procedures would not apply to at-will employees. Being forced to
operate in an at-will system, however, would further increase the cost of
public employment. Thus, the burden on the MTDB clearly outweighs
any value or necessity in requiring the subpoenaing of third-party
witnesses.

A balancing of the Eldridge factors therefore reveals that while
Townsel has a significant interest in continued employment, such an
interest is outweighed by the MTDB's interest in an efficient and
competent public employment system. As a result, requiring the
government to prove its termination case at the post-termination hearing,
and forcing it to subpoena third-party witnesses, goes beyond the
minimal procedural safeguards contemplated by Eldridge.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Townsel court reached the correct result, but for the wrong
reasons. Because Townsel was not provided the opportunity to confront
adverse MTDB witnesses, he was not provided the minimal posttermination safeguards required by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. For this reason, the result of Townsel was
correct.
Nonetheless, the Townsel court reached its decision not by Properly
balancing the three factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,' but by
broadly concluding that all permanent public employees have a
constitutional right to a full, trial-like post-evidentiary hearing where the
government must prove its termination case, regardless of whether such
a hearing is provided by statute. This type of hearing, while clearly
adequate to protect a public employee's due process rights, is not
required by procedural due process in all circumstances.
Posttermination evidentiary hearings that fall short of the type envisioned by
the Townsel court are constitutionally sufficient so long as they meet

certain minimal procedural safeguards.

Requiring the government to

prove its termination case and requiring the government to subpoena
third-party witnesses are not among these minimal procedural
safeguards. Consequently, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth
District's holding in Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit

166.
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Development Board 67 created an overly broad Constitutional standard

that goes beyond the minimum requirements of post-termination
procedural due process.
MATrHEw S. BUTrACAVOLI

167.

77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231 (Ct. App. 1998).
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